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TORT

LAW-DAMAGES--IMPOSITION

OF

PuNmvE

DAMAGES

ON

ESTATE-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
punitive damages could be recovered from the estate of the
deceased tortfeasor.
DECEASED'S

G.J.D. and D.K and J.K v. Johnson, 713 A.2d 1127 (Pa. 1998).
Darwin T. Thebes ("Thebes") photographed Gloria Jean Diehl
("G.J.D") while she was nude and when she was performing oral
sex.1 After discovering that G.J.D. was breaking up with him,
Thebes allegedly delivered photocopies of the photographs to
G.J.D.'s friends, family, and employer.2 The distribution of the
photocopies ceased after G.J.D. and her children ("the
3
complainants") filed a complaint against Thebes.
Thebes committed suicide before the case went to trial,' and
Geraldine T. Johnson ("Johnson"), executrix of Thebes' estate, was
substituted as the defendant. 2 Subsequently, a jury awarded both
compensatory and punitive damages to the complainants. 3 On
1. G.J.D. and D.K. and J.K. v. Johnson, 713 A-2d 1127, 1128 (Pa. 1998). According to
testimony, after G.J.D. and her children moved in with Thebes, he became verbally,
physically, and psychologically abusive to G.J.D. G.J.D. and D.K. and J.K. v. Johnson, 669
A.2d 378, 379 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995), aff'd, 713 A-2d 1127 (Pa. 1998). The picture of G.J.D.
nude and the picture of her performing fellatio on Thebes were taken several years before
they appeared throughout the community. Brief for Appellees at 2, G.J.D. and D.K and J.K
(No. 75 M.D. Appeal Docket 1996). According to G.J.D. and her children, Thebes also took
Polaroid pictures of G.J.D. after physically abusing her. G.J.D. and D.K. and J.K, 669 A.2d
at 379. Because of the abuse, G.J.D. sent her children to live with their grandmother and,
eventually, also moved out. Id. at 380.
2. G.J.D. and D.K and J.K, 713 A-2d at 1128. On one occasion, G.J.D.'s daughter, Julie
Kell ("J.K."), discovered the photocopied pictures when she was exhibiting her goats at the
Perry County Fair. G.J.D. and D.K and J.K, 669 A.2d. at 380. The photographs were
captioned: "Suck lollipops for money, [G.J.D.], 582-4407, New Bloomfield, PA." Id. The other
pictures were discovered by G.J.D.'s family and friends when they were at public gatherings
that were also attended by Thebes. Id.
3. G.J.D. and D.K and J.K, 713 A.2d at 1128. The complaint contained counts of
defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false light invasion of privacy, and
invasion of privacy by publicity given to private life. Id. The complaint was filed on February
20, 1987 in the Perry County Court of Common Pleas. Brief for Appellant at 4, G.J.D. and
D.K and J.K (No. 75 M.D. Appeal Docket 1996).
1. G.J.D. and D.K and J.K, 713 A.2d at 1128. Thebes committed suicide
approximately fifteen months after G.J.D. filed suit; however, both he and the complainants
were deposed before his death. G.J.D. and D.K and J.K, 669 A.2d at 380.
2. G.J.D. and D.K and J.K, 713 K2d at 1128.
3. Id. G.J.D. testified that both of her children had developed emotional, scholastic,
and behavioral problems because of the distribution of the photocopies. G.J.D. and D.K and
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appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, Johnson raised the
following two issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in allowing
the jury to consider evidence as to punitive damages and in
permitting the complainants to recover the damages when Thebes
was dead; and (2) whether the trial court erred in ruling that the
discovery conducted before Thebes died caused a waiver of the
Dead Man's Rule, thereby allowing the complainants to testify as
4
competent witnesses.
The superior court found that the deterrence aspect of punitive
damages was not defeated by the defendant's death because such
damages were intended to deter other potential wrongdoers.5
Determining that the deterrence function of punitive damages was
not defeated, the superior court agreed with the trial court and
held that punitive damages were recoverable from Thebes' estate. 6
In addition to its finding of viability of the deterrent effect, the
court opined that the jury was aware of the value of the deceased's
estate before making a determination and that the trial court may
grant a remittitur7 if the damage award shocks the conscience of
the court.8 Disposing of the second issue, the court held that the
protection of the Dead Man's Act was waived by discovery
conducted before Thebes' death.9
J.K, 669 A.2d at 380. J.K required psychiatric care, including a three-month stay at York
Hospital. Id. David Kell ("D.K") -eventually lost his Reserve Officer Training Corps
scholarship because of his poor academic performance during his first year at Pennsylvania
State University. Id. The jury awarded G.J.D. $6,015.00 in compensatory damages and
$36,500.00 in punitive damages; D.K. $5,000.00 in compensatory damages and $20,000.00 in
punitive damages; and J.K $10,000.00 in compensatory damages and $20,000.00 in punitive
damages. Id.
4. G.J.D. and D.K and J.K,669 A.2d at 380-81.
5. Id. at 382. The superior court held that under Pennsylvania law, an award of
punitive damages serves both to deter and to punish. Id. (citing Perry v. Melton,..299 S.E.2d
8, 12 (W.Va. 1982)). The court acknowledged that the punishment aspect of punitive damages
is defeated by the tortfeasor's death; however, the court argued that the deterrence of others
from engaging in similar conduct serves a public interest in addition to a private interest. Id.
6. Id.
7. Remittitur is defined as: the procedural process by which an excessive verdict of the
jury is reduced. BLACK'S LAw DIcTioNARY 1295 (6th ed. 1990).
8. G.J.D. and D.K and J.K, 669 A.2d at 383. Aware that the total value of the
deceased's estate was $274,017.51, the jury imposed $76,500.00 in punitive damages based on
its assessment of the need for punishment and deterrence. Id.
9. Id. at 384. The Dead Man's Act provides the following:
[In any civil action or proceeding, where any party to a thing or contract in action is
dead... and his right thereto or therein has passed. . . to a party on the record who
represents his interest in the subject in controversy, neither any surviving or
remaining party to such thing or contract, nor any other person whose interest shall
be adverse to the said right of such deceased... , shall be a competent witness to
any matter occurring before the death of said party ...
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On appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Johnson argued
only that the recovery of punitive damages from the decedent's
estate was improper because neither of the policy objectives of
punitive damages would be fulfilled when the person to be
punished or deterred is deceased. 10 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court granted allocator" to resolve the following issue of first
impression: whether punitive damages may be recovered from a
12
deceased tortfeasor's estate.
Writing for the majority, Justice Zappala noted that the majority
of courts that have addressed this issue have held that punitive
damages may not be recovered from the deceased tortfeasor's
estate.' 3 When the tortfeasor is deceased, most courts reason that
the primary objectives behind imposing punitive damages are not
furthered. 14 The court found that only five states (not including
Pennsylvania) currently permit the recovery of punitive damages
from the deceased tortfeasor's estate. 5 Pointing to one case in
particular, the court emphasized the importance of furthering
certain societal interests. 6 The court discussed the case of Schwab
v. Bates, in which the strong public interest in deterring drunk
driving persuaded the lower court to allow an award of punitive
damages. 7 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reasoned that Thebes'
42 PA. CONS. STAT.§ 5930 (1987). The court found that the Dead Man's Act was waived by the
taking of a deposition of a witness concerning any occurrences involving a deceased party.
G.J.D. and D.K and J.K, 669 A.2d at 384. (citing Perlis v. Kuhns, 195 A.2d 156, 158 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1967)).
10. G.J.D. and D.K and J.K, 713 A.2d at 1128, 1129. Johnson did not dispute the
decedent's culpability or the award of compensatory damages on appeal. Id. at 1128.
11. Id. at 1129. Allocatur means the appeal is allowed, or that the court is taking the
case on appeal. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 75 (6th ed. 1990).
12. G.J.D. and D.K and J.K, 713 A.2d at 1129.
13. Id. Of the thirty-three jurisdictions to have addressed the issue, twenty-eight have
decided that recovery is not allowed. Id. Fourteen states have enacted legislation that
specifically precludes such recovery, and the states without specific legislation are split as to
whether recovery is allowed. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. For example, finding that the imposition of punitive damages was appropriate,
the Montana Supreme Court relied on the plain language of the statute that provided in
pertinent part that "a jury may award... punitive damages for sake of example and for the
purpose of punishing the defendant." Id. (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-220 (1995)). The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court also discussed an Illinois decision that allowed the award of
punitive damages to punish and deter the tortfeasor and others from engaging in like
conduct. Id. at 1130. (citing Penberthy v. Price, 666 N.E. 2d 352 ( Ill. 1996)).
16. G.J.D. and D.K and J.K, 713 A.2d at 1130. (citing Schwab v. Bates, 12 Pa. D.& C.
4th 162 (1991)). In Schwab, the court permitted the imposition of punitive damages against
the estate of a decedent who injured the plaintiff as a result of driving while intoxicated. Id.
17. G.J.D. and D.K and J.K, 713 A.2d at 1130. (discussing Schwab, 12 Pa. D.& C.4th
at 162 (1991)).
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outrageous behavior was analogous to drunk driving and asserted
that the law should be applied so as to deter such egregious
conduct.18 Holding that there was no per se prohibition against the
imposition of punitive damages against an estate, Justice Zappala
noted that the trier of fact should consider the nature of the acts
committed and not the category of tortious conduct alleged when
assessing the appropriateness of a punitive damage award.1 9
In support of its decision, the court first noted that the
tortfeasor's death did not completely destroy the underlying
purposes of punitive damages because others may be deterred from
engaging in similar conduct." The court next reasoned that the
innocent beneficiaries of the estate would not be punished any
more than they would have been if the tortfeasor were living when
the jury awarded damages.2 1 Finally, the court determined that
sufficient safeguards exist to protect an estate from the arbitrary
imposition of punitive damages.22 Affirnting the superior court's
decision, the supreme court majority concluded that the
complainants could recover punitive damages from the deceased
23
tortfeasor's estate.
Chief Justice Flaherty, in dissent, began his opinion by restating
the underlying objectives of punitive damages: punishment and
deterrence. 24 The dissent argued that the majority's decision does
not further either of these objectives because the general deterrent
effect on others is highly speculative. 5 The dissent's analysis points
18. Id. at 1131.
19. Id.
20. Id. (citing Kirkbride v. Lisbon Contractors Inc., 555 A.2d 800 (Pa- 1989)). The court
further explained that the general deterrent effect was no more speculative in the instant
case than it was in cases where the tortfeasor was alive. Id.
21. G.J.D. and D.K. and J.K., 713 A.2d at 1131. The court noted that allowing the
tortfeasor's estate to circumvent an award of punitive damage would be similar to the
injustice of permitting a defendant to transfer his wealth to his family before a trial after
discovering that punitive damages were being sought. Id.
22. Id. First, the court stated that jury instructions provide the fact finders with
knowledge that the award of punitive damages would be imposed against the estate. Id.
Second, the court stressed that the trial court may grant a remittitur if the award shocks the
conscience of the court. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1132 (Flaherty, C.J., dissenting).
25. Id. Chief Justice Flaherty explained that the penal nature of punitive damages
results in the availability of a quasi-criminal sanction in civil proceedings, thus, punitive
damages, unlike compensatory damages, impose punishment and make an example of the
wrongdoer. Id. Conceding that a living tortfeasor would be specifically deterred from future
conduct, the dissent disagreed with the majority that other potential tortfeasors would be
generally deterred by the imposition of punitive damages against a deceased tortfeasor's
estate. Id.
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out that, although the ordinary reasonable person is aware of the
punishment associated with criminal behavior, the same person is
most likely unaware of the consequences associated with tortious
conduct. 26 Because of this lack of awareness, the dissent asserted
that imposing punitive sanctions in the hopes of deterring potential
tortfeasors does not justify the punishment of innocent
27
beneficiaries.
The dissent argued that the beneficiaries' interests in the estate
attach when the tortfeasor dies, whereas the plaintiffs interest in
punitive damages does not attach until a jury hands down the
award. 28 Relying on this argument, the dissent reasoned that any
such recovery by the plaintiff would be at the expense of the
already attached interests of the beneficiaries. 29 To further support
his position, the chief justice pointed to Feld v. Merriam30 to
establish the court's acceptance of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. 31 Although Feld did not address the issue of punitive
damages in the context of a deceased tortfeasor, the court relied
on the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which, the dissent stated,
disallows the recovery of punitive damages against a deceased's
estate. 32 In addition, the dissent asserted that the court in Feld
emphasized the consideration of relations between the parties.33
Emphasizing the same consideration, the dissent asserted that it
would be unjust to hold the beneficiaries responsible for Thebes'
26. G.J.D. and D.K and J.K, 713 .2d at 1133.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1133-34.
30. Feld v. Merriam, 485 A.2d 742 (Pa- 1984). The Felds, as tenants in an apartment
complex, brought an action against their landlords for a breach of the duty to protect
tenants from the foreseeable criminal acts of third persons. Id. at 744-45.
31. G.J.D. and D.K and J.K, 713 Ak2d at 1134. The Restatement (Second) of Torts §
908 provides as follows:
(1) Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory or nominal damages,
awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him
and others like him from similar conduct in the future. (2) Punitive damages may be
awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant's evil motive or his
reckless indifference to the rights of others. In assessing punitive damages, the trier of
fact can properly consider the character of the defendant's act, the nature and extent
of the harm to the plaintiff that the defendant caused or intended to cause and the
wealth of the defendant.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TomS § 908 (1979). The comments following § 908 state that
"Punitive damages are not awarded against the representatives of a deceased tortfeasor nor,
ordinarily, in an action under a death statute." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Toms § 908 cmt. a
(1979).
32. Feld, 485 A-2d at 747.
33. G.J.D. and D.K and J.K, 713 A-2d at 1134 (referring to Feld, 485 A.2d at 748).
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conduct because there was no relationship between the
complainants and the estate beneficiaries 4 For the preceding
reasons, the chief justice would not allow a recovery of punitive
35
damages.
Many jurisdictions have confronted the issue of whether punitive
damages are recoverable from a deceased tortfeasor's estate.3
Presently, six jurisdictions (including Pennsylvania) that have
addressed the issue have allowed such recovery.3 7 The majority of
jurisdictions that have faced this issue have, however, denied the
imposition of punitive damages against a dead tortfeasor's estate.38
In 1884, in Shiek v. Hobson 9 the Iowa Supreme Court examined
whether exemplary or punitive damages could be awarded against
the deceased wrongdoer's personal representatives. 40 In its analysis,
the court interpreted Iowa's survival statute to mean that all causes
of action survive death, regardless of whether the death is that of
the person wronged or the death of the wrongdoer. 41 Although it
agreed that the plaintiff was entitled to full compensation for her
injury, the court in Shiek distinguished a plaintiff's right to
compensation from the right to receive punitive damages. 42 Despite
its recognition that punitive damages are awarded to punish a
person who has wickedly or wantonly violated the rights of
another, the court reasoned that the punitory powers of the law
end when the defendant dies.4 Thus, the court held that allowing
punitive damages to be assessed against the decedent's estate
would only punish the defendant's representatives for the wrongful
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Paul Minnich, Comment, Punitive Damages and the Deceased Tortfeasor: Should
Pennsylvania Courts allow Punitive Damages to be Recovered from a Decedent's Estate?, 98
DicK L REv. 329-30 (1994).
37. Id. In his comment, Minnich states that only three jurisdictions allow recovery from
a deceased's estate. Since 1994, however, Montana and Illinois have also permitted the
recovery of punitive damages from the decedent's estate. See i'llet v. Lippert, 909 P2d 1158
(Mont. 1996); Penberthy v. Price, 666 N.E. 2d 352 (11l. 1996). Thus, the states that permit the
recovery of punitive damages against a deceased tortfeasor's estate include the following:
West Virginia, Texas, Alabama, Illinois, Montana, and Pennsylvania38. Minnich, supra note 39, at 333.
39. 19 N.W 875 (Iowa 1884).
40. Shiek, 19 N.W. at 875. The defendant was sued for slander for allegedly making a
statement, in the presence of the plaintiff's husband, that the defendant had enjoyed sexual
intercourse with the plaintiff. Id. The defendant died while the suit was pending. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 875-76.
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acts of the decedent."
Forty-one years later, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit cited Shiek in Sullivan v. Associated Billposters
and Distributors of the United Stated and Canada.45 In Sullivan,
the court relied on the general rule that there is no right to
punitive or exemplary damages when the cause of action has
survived the tortfeasor.46 Adhering to this general rule, the Tenth
Circuit in Barnes v. Smith47 also held that punitive damages were
not available from the wrongdoer's estate because the reason for
their imposition would no longer be effective."
In 1977, the Nevada Supreme Court in Allen v. Anderson49
followed this same reasoning when it addressed the issue of the
imposition of punitive damages against a deceased tortfeasor's
estate. In Allen, an automobile passenger initiated an action for
compensatory and punitive damages against two drivers who were'
involved in an accident that resulted in the plaintiffs injuries. 5° One
of the drivers was killed in the accident.5 1 Plaintiff alleged that both
drivers were under the influence of alcohol and that such conduct
warranted punitive damages.5 2
The court determined that neither the deceased tortfeasor's
estate nor the decedent's father could be held liable for punitive
damages.5 Relying on Nevada's punitive damages statute, the court
asserted are such damages were awarded to make an example of
the defendant and to punish the defendant4 Because punitive
44.

Id.

45. Sullivan v. Associated Billposters and Distrib. of the U.S. and Can., 6 F2d 1000 (2d
Cir. 1925).
46. Sullivan, 6 F2d at 1012.
47. Barnes v. Smith, 305 F2d 226 (10th Cir. 1962). A Cadillac collided with a family of
eight in a pick-up truck resulting in six deaths, including those of both drivers, and three
severe injuries. Id.
48. Barnes, 305 F.2d at 231. The court noted that there appeared to be no New Mexico
case on point; however, of the courts that considered the issue, virtually all have held that
punitive damages are not available from the deceased wrongdoer's estate. Id.
49. 562 P.2d 487 (Nev. 1977).
50. Allen, 562 P.2d at 488. Plaintiffs complaint alleged the following: (1) the drivers,
while under the influence of alcohol, negligently and carelessly operated their vehicles,
causing her injuries; and (2) the drivers' conduct constituted fraud, oppression, or malice,
pursuant to Nevada Revised Statutes, section 42.010, thus warranting punitive damages. Id.
51.

Id.

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. The statute provides the following:
In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where the
defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice, express or implied, the
plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of
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damages are imposed to deter future wrongdoing, a dead tortfeasor
no longer remains susceptible to punishment. 55 Thus, the court
reasoned that the tortfeasor's death thwarted the purpose of
punitive damages.Joining the majority of jurisdictions to hold that punitive
damages are not recoverable from the deceased tortfeasor's estate,
the Supreme Court of Florida set precedent in Lohr v. Byrd.57 Lohr,
who was driving while intoxicated, caused an automobile accident
that resulted in his death.58 The plaintiff, Byrd, sought
compensatory and punitive damages from Lohr's estate for the
injuries he sustained in the collision. 59 At trial, the jury returned a
verdict for the plaintiff, which included $25,000 in punitive
damages. 6° Granting the defendant's motion for remittitur, the trial
court reduced the punitive damages award to $9,000.61 Challenging
the remittitur, the plaintiff appealed, and the district court of
appeals certified the question of punitive damages to the Supreme
Court of Florida. 62 Id. at 688.
The Supreme Court of Florida held that punitive damages may
not be awarded against a deceased tortfeasor's estate. 63 After
explaining that the purpose of punitive damages is to both punish
and deter the tortfeasor, the majority rejected the plaintiff's
deterrence argument that a potential tortfeasor would avoid
tortious conduct if he knew that his estate could be subject to
punitive damages. 64 If it were to accept this argument, the court
example and by way of punishing the defendant.
NEv. REV. STAT. 42:010 (1989).
55. Al/en, 562 P.2d at 488. (citing Wagner v. Gibbs, 31 So. 434 (Miss. 1902).
56. Id. The court added that "[wihen the reason for a rule ceases to exist, the rule
itself is no longer of value and is extinguished by the disappearance of the reason." Id. at
490. (citing Braun v. Moreno, 466 P.2d 60, 63 (Ariz.1970)).
57. Lohr v. Byrd, 522 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1988).
58. Lohr, 522 So. 2d at 846.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. The Fifth District Court of Appeal reasoned that it was bound to follow Atlas
Properties, Inc. v. Didich, 226 So. 2d 684 (Fla- 1969) because of the following dictum:
It appears that logic and common sense indicate that this Court should now... allow
the recovery of punitive damages under [the survival statute]. This appears to be true
regardless of whether it is the tortfeasor or the injured party who dies. Certainly, this
logic is more apposite when it is the injured party who dies (as we have here) rather
than the actual tortfeasor.
63. Lohr, 522 So. 2d at 847.
64. Id. at 847. The plaintiff relied on Stephens v. Rohde, 478 So. 2d 862-63 (Fla- 1st
D.C.A. 1985).
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reasoned a decedent's widow and children could be placed on
welfare as a result of the decedent's wrongdoing.6 Accordingly, the
court held that, in addition to defeating the purposes behind
punitive damages, such an award would only punish the tortfeasor's
innocent heirs and creditors.6
In opposition, the dissent argued that the court had already
addressed this issue in Atlas Properties, Inc.6 The dissent stated
that, although in dictum, the court in Atlas Properties, Inc.
reasoned that the survival statute appeared to allow the recovery of
punitive damages whether it was the tortfeasor or the injured party
who died.6 In addition, the dissent asserted that most jurisdictions
base the decision to preclude recovery from a deceased tortfeasor's
estate by either relying upon statutes that expressly prohibit the
recovery of such damages or by not interpreting the particular
jurisdiction's survival statute.6 9
The dissent also examined the plain language of Florida's survival
statute and concluded that, because no distinction was made
between compensatory and punitive damages, punitive damages
may be recovered from the tortfeasor's estate.70 Furthermore, the
dissent argued that the justification for punitive damages includes
making an example of the wrongdoer to deter others from engaging
in similar conduct. 71 In concluding the argument for allowing the
imposition of punitive damages against the deceased's estate, the
dissent urged that, in cases involving a tortfeasor's outrageous
conduct of a wilful and wanton nature, the tortfeasor's untimely
72
death should not preclude the recovery of punitive damages.
In 1984, in Hofer v. Lavender,73 the Supreme Court of Texas
addressed the issue of whether exemplary damages may be
recovered from a tortfeasor's estate when a statute specifically
provided that all causes of action survived against the deceased's
representatives. 74 This action arose when a drunk driver struck
65.

Lohr, 522 So. 2d at 847.

66.

Id.

67. Id. at 848 (Grimes, J., dissenting) (citing Atlas Properties,Inc., 226 So. 2d at 688).
68. Id.
69. Id. (citing Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex.1984).
"
70. Lohr, 522 So.2d at 848. The statute provides that [n]o cause of action dies with
the person. All causes of action survive and may be commenced, prosecuted, and defended
in the name of the person prescribed by law. FiA STAT. ch. 46.021 (1985).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 849.
73. J.D. Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1984).
74. Hofer, 679 S.W. 2d at 471.
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another vehicle and killed eighteen-year-old June Hofer.75 The drunk
driver died from unrelated causes before the case came to trial and
Lavender was substituted as the defendant.7 6 Hofer's parents, who
were also passengers, sought exemplary damages for themselves
7
and for their deceased daughter's estate.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Texas, the Hofers argued that
all causes of action survive under the Texas survival statute,
including those against the tortfeasor's estate. 78 In response,
Lavender contended that because the purpose of punitive damages
was punishment, the tortfeasor's death defeated the basis for such
an award. 79 In its analysis, the court agreed that a survival statute
operates to ensure that an injured party's death does not abate the
recovery of exemplary damages by the estate.8 0 Distinguishing this
case from cases in which courts did not allow punitive damages,
such as Barnes v. Smith,81 the court noted that those cases did not
82
involve interpretation of a survival statute.
Focusing on the purpose of punitive damages as recognized by
Texas law, the court asserted, that in addition to punishment, Texas
case law indicated that the public policy for punitive damages
included other equally important considerations such as setting an
example to others, serving as an example for the good of the
public, and compensating the plaintiff for inconvenience and
attorney's fees.83 The court held that under the Texas Survival
Statute, the plaintiff has the right to collect punitive damages from
75. Id.
76. Id. at 470.
77. Id. at 470, 471. The trial court awarded both sets of exemplary damages to the
Hofers; the court of appeals reversed. Id. at 471.
78. Id. at 472. The statute provides in pertinent part:
All causes of action upon which suit has been... brought for personal injuries, or for
injuries resulting in death whether such injuries be to the health or to the reputation,
or to the person of the injured party, shall not abate be reason of the death of the
person against whom such causes of action shall have accrued, nor by reason of the
death of such injured person, but, in the case of the death of either or both, all such
causes of action shall survive to and in favor of the heirs and legal representatives
and estate of such injured party and against the person, or persons liable for such
injuries . . . , and may be instituted and prosecuted as if such action or persons
against whom same accrued were alive.
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5525 (repealed and revised in TEY Civ. PRAc. & RE. CODE ANN.
§71.021 (West 1997)).
79. Hofer, 679 S.W.2d at 471.
80. Id. at 472.
81. Barnes v. Smith, 305 F.2d 226 (10th Cir. 1962).
82. Hofer, 679 S.W.2d at 472.
83. Id. at 472-73.
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a deceased tortfeasor's estate. s4
In one dissenting opinion, Justice Spears argued that the survival
statute's language was not dispositive of the issue; therefore, the
court should have investigated the purposes behind punitive
damages.8 5 The dissent argued that the twin aims of punitive
damages, punishing the tortfeasor and providing an example to
deter others, are not separable.8 6 The dissent contended that a
general deterrent effect, which is the only deterrent effect available
after a tortfeasor dies, could not be considered in isolation.8 7 The
justice explained that general deterrence depends on the specific
punishment imposed on the tortfeasor and that, without that
punishment, the general deterrent effect diminishes significantly.88
Thus, the dissent would have found that the plaintiff's isolated
deterrence argument was insufficient to support an award of
punitive damages from the deceased's estate.8 9
Also rejecting the majority's reasoning, Chief Justice Pope, in his
dissent, argued against additional actual damages masquerading as
punitive damages 0 Chief Justice Pope espoused that the only
sound basis for awarding punitive damages is to punish the
wrongdoer, not to punish the deceased's children or family.91
In 1996, the Supreme Court of Montana sided with the minority
of jurisdictions to permit recovery of punitive damages from a
deceased's estate in TiUet v. Lippert.92 The decedent, Kenneth
Lippert, had pointed a loaded gun at the plaintiff and fired seven
84. Id. at 475.
85. Id. at 477 (Spears, J., dissenting). Pointing to the language of the statute, the
dissent argued that exemplary damages against an estate are neither allowed nor disallowed.
Id.
86. Hofer, 679 S.W.2d at 478.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 479 (Pope, C.J., dissenting). After arguing that punitive damages should not
be used to cloak additional elements of actual damage and that the courts are careful to
require a measure of certainty in all other forms of compensatory damages, the chief justice
posed the following questions:
Why should we allow punitive damages to stand alone without any standards or
instructions necessary for recovery[?] If punitive damages serve to permit recovery for
some kind of unmentioned compensation, how can we know that there is not a
double recovery? If punitive damages mask phantom elements of actual damages, why
is it that a plaintiff in an ordinary negligence case is denied those illusive forms of
compensatory damages, but a plaintiff can recover them when he proves gross
negligence?
Id. (Pope, C.J., dissenting).
91. Hofer, 679 S.W. 2d at 479-80.
92. Tillet v. Lippert, 909 P.2d 1158 (Mont. 1996).
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shots at the plaintiff's tires.9 3 Thereafter, but before trial, Kenneth
Lippert died.9 The lower court found that Lippert's conduct was
"outrageous and done with actual malice;" therefore, the court
allowed the plaintiff to recover punitive damages to discourage
future potential tortfeasors from engaging in similar conduct.95
The issue of whether punitive damages could be assessed against
96
a deceased's estate was one of first impression in Montana.
Relying on statutory authority, the court identified the dual
purposes of punitive damages as to serve as an example and to
punish the defendant.97 The court noted that punishing Lippert
"[was] now beyond the jurisdiction of this temporal court," but the
exemplary function would send a message to the public at large
98
that intimidation by firing guns would not be tolerated.
The dissent disagreed with the majority's holding that Montana's
survival act and dual purpose punitive damage statute distinguish
Montana from other jurisdictions that deny an award of punitive
damages. 9 Many courts, the dissent suggested, that did not permit
such recovery were also in states with survival acts and had dual
purposes underlying the award of punitive damages. 100 The dissent
further contended that the plain language of the punitive damage
statute provided authority to require both setting an example and
punishing
the defendant because of the use of the conjunctive
"and." 10 1 The dissent concluded that the tortfeasor's punishment
was the deterrence; therefore, both purposes were required.
In the same year that the Montana Supreme Court decided Tillet,
Penberthy v. Price'0 2 gave the Appellate Court of Illinois its
opportunity to consider the same issue. The plaintiffs in Penberthy
asserted theories of negligence and wilful and wanton behavior
93. TM//et, 909 P.2d at 1161. The parties in this action, extended family members, lived
as cotenants on approximately 240 acres known as the "home place"and were involved in a
bitter family dispute. Id. at 1159.
94. Id. at 1161.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Ti//et, 909 P.2d at 1162. Montana's statute provides as follows: "Except as otherwise
expressly provided by statute, a judge or jury may award, in addition to compensatory
damages, punitive damages for the sake of example and for the purpose of punishing a
defendant." MONT. CODE. ANN. § 27-1-220 (1997).
98. Id. at 1162.
99. Id. at 1163 (Erdmann, J., dissenting).
100. Id. (Erdmann, J., dissenting) (citing Allen v. Anderson, 562 P.2d 487, 489
(Nev.1977); Byrd v. Lohr, 488 So.2d 138, 139 (Fla. 1986)).
101. Id. at 1164.
102. Penberthy v. Price, 666 N.E.2d 352 (111.App.3d 1996).
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after an intoxicated driver collided with their car, causing them to
suffer injuries. 10 3 The intoxicated driver died in the accident.1°"
After reviewing the history of survival actions, the majority relied
on Illinois case law to conclude that the plaintiffs' punitive damage
claim could survive against the deceased's estate.10 5 Case law
instructed the court to heed strong equitable considerations in
addition to other purposes underlying the imposition of punitive
damages against a deceased's estate. 1 6 The court, therefore, held
that allowing punitive damages would not only deter others, but
would also enhance the strong public policy against drinking and
driving.' 07
In another drunk driving case, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court faced the question of whether punitive damages were
recoverable against the deceased driver's estate in Schwab v.
Bates.0 5 Narrowing its holding to apply to specific outrageous
conduct, the court determined that a plaintiff could seek punitive
damages from a deceased's estate when the conduct that was to be
deterred in others was driving while intoxicated.' °
The court initially asserted that the Pennsylvania legislature had
provided that all causes of action against a tortfeasor survived the
tortfeasor's death."10 Because the statute allows a deceased
103. Penberthy, 666 N.E.2d at 353.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 354-57.
106. Id. at 355. The court cited to-Raisl v. Elwood Industries, Inc., 479 N.E. 2d 1106
(ll.App.3d 1985). Id. The Raist court found the following two exceptions to minois' general
rule of abatement of punitive damages' claims: (1) "when a statutory basis exists for such
claims or when such claims are an integral component of the regulatory scheme and of the
remedy which is available under it; or (2) when strong equitable considerations favor
survival." Id. The court also relied on Grunloh v. Effingham Equity, Inc., 528 N.E.2d 1031
(Ill. App. 3d 1988). Id. at 356. Grunloh expanded on the strong equitable considerations
exception in Raisl by listing relevant matters that should be considered, such as the
following:
[wlhether the defendant's alleged conduct offends against a strong and clearly
articulated public policy; whether the underlying conduct constituted intentional
misconduct which is also a crime . . . ; and whether absent an award of punitive
damages, a plaintiff who prevailed on the merits of his or her claim would at most be
entitled to only a comparatively small recovery.
Id.
107. Penberthy, 666 N.E.2d at 356-57.
108. 12 Pa. D.& C.4th 162 (1991).
109. Schwab, 12 Pa. D.& C.4th at 168.
110. Id. at 163. Pennsylvania's survival statute provides that " [a]ll causes of action or,
proceedings, real or personal, shall survive the death of the plaintiff or of the defendant, or
the death of one or more joint plaintiffs or defendants." 42 PA. CONS. STAT ANN. § 8302 (West
1982).
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plaintiffs estate to recover punitive damages, the court reasoned
that, if sound policy reasons exist, such recovery should also be
allowed against the deceased tortfeasor's estate."' The court found
that, in Pennsylvania, punitive damages are awarded to punish a
party for certain outrageous conduct and to deter that person and
others from similar conduct. 112 Realizing that the opportunity to
punish the defendant is eliminated by death, the court stated that
stronger consideration should be given to the deterrence effect on
3
others considering the importance in deterring drunk driving."
Recognizing the need to use a balancing test, the court opined
that weighing the possible harm that could be suffered by the
deceased's family against the harm that could be prevented to
many innocent families by deterring drunk driving, the clear choice
4
should be to attempt to deter the conduct."
That same year, a Pennsylvania trial court in Morfesi v.
Sherman"5 addressed the same issue, but did not allow punitive
damages to be imposed against a deceased's estate.1 6 The plaintiffs
in Morfesi sought punitive damages for medical malpractice against
the doctor's estate." 7 Turning to Pennsylvania's twin aims of
punitive damages-punishing the defendant and deterring others
from similar conduct- the court found that death took away the
punishment effect of such damages.18 The court, focusing on the
deterrence element, narrowed its inquiry to whether Pennsylvania
courts should permit punitive damages in this instance as a matter
of public policy."9
The court noted that deciding Whether deterrence, standing
alone, was a strong enough reason to support a punitive damage
claim requires a subjective answer because no objective statistics
are available. 20 The court in Morfesi believed that the deterrence
theory is weak, especially when negligence or carelessness is the
12
conduct to be deterred, because such conduct is not intentional. '
The court, therefore, concluded that punitive damages could not be
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id. (citing Kirkbride v. Lisbon Contractors, Inc., 555 A.2d 800, 803 (Pa. 1989)).
Id. at 166.
Schwab, 12 Pa. D.& C.4th at 167.
13 Pa D. & C.4th 552 (1991).
Morfesi, 13 Pa- D.& C.4th at 553.
Id.
Id. at 555.
Id.
Id. at 555-56.
Morfesi, 13 Pa. D.& C.4th at 556.
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imposed against the deceased doctor's estate.'2
The history of the imposition of punitive damages against a
decedent's estate does not support the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's decision in G.J.D. v. Johnson. The G.J.D. majority held that
"there [was] ho per se prohibition against imposing such punitive
damages against an estate;" therefore, the court left that
determination to the trier of fact."2 Weighing the factors involved,
the jury looked beyond the twin aims of punitive damages and
focused on attempting to deter such egregious behavior in the
future. By leaving the issue to the trier of fact, the court avoided
an explanation of how this award of damages squares with
Pennsylvania's punitive damage objectives: punishment and
deterrence.
What the court fails to address is whether a general deterrent
actually deters others from similar conduct. Obviously, Thebes
cannot be punished or deterred; therefore, the court placed great
emphasis on the hope of a general deterrent. The court could not
rely heavily on other jurisdictions for authority because the
majority of states do not permit such recovery. In fact, the
strongest arguments against the imposition of punitive damages is
the speculative nature of a general deterrent.
Another persuasive argument against imposing punitive damages
against the deceased's estate is the injustice of hurting the
innocent, surviving family members. Again disregarding the
majority of the states, the court held that the family would be no
worse than if the tortfeasor had lived. 24 If the tortfeasor had lived,
he would be punished or deterred. With the tortfeasor dead, the
family will be punished for the tortfeasor's wrong. In addition, the
court found that sufficient safeguards exist to protect against an
unreasonable punitive damages award. 125 Although safeguards are
important to any imposition of punitive damages, the first
determination must be whether such damages are even permitted.
Although it is true that G.J.D. deserves more than compensatory
damages for the pain she and her family endured, the tortfeasor,
Thebes, committed suicide and effectively took himself out of the
scope of punitive damages because he could no longer be punished
or deterred. The G.J.D. court failed to expand the permissible
policy reasons for the imposition of punitive damages. If the court
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
G.J.D. and D.X- and J.K. v. Johnson, 713 A.2d 1127, 1131 (Pa- 1998).
G.J.D. and D.K and J.K, 713 A.2d at 1131.
Id.
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wishes to expand those reasons to include attorneys' fees or
additional compensation, the court should simply say so. By relying
on a general deterrent effect, the court fails to ensure that punitive
damages imposed against a deceased tortfeasor's estate will be
effective for this speculative purpose.
Jill L. Locnikar

